International Journal of Computer and Communication
Technology
Volume 3

Issue 2

Article 10

April 2012

Cryptanalysis of the Fast Lightweight Mutual Authentication
Protocol
Masoumeh Safkhani
Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran1,2, m_Safkhani@iust.ac.ir

Majid Naderi
Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran1,2, M_Naderi@iust.ac.ir

Habib F. Rashvand
Electrical Engineering Department, School of Engineering , University of Warwick3,
H.Rashvand@warwick.ac.uk

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.interscience.in/ijcct

Recommended Citation
Safkhani, Masoumeh; Naderi, Majid; and Rashvand, Habib F. (2012) "Cryptanalysis of the Fast Lightweight
Mutual Authentication Protocol," International Journal of Computer and Communication Technology: Vol.
3 : Iss. 2 , Article 10.
DOI: 10.47893/IJCCT.2012.1127
Available at: https://www.interscience.in/ijcct/vol3/iss2/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Interscience Journals at Interscience Research
Network. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Journal of Computer and Communication Technology
by an authorized editor of Interscience Research Network. For more information, please contact
sritampatnaik@gmail.com.

Cryptanalysis of the Fast Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol

Cryptanalysis of the Fast Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol
Masoumeh Safkhani 1, Majid Naderi 2, Habib F. Rashvand3
Electrical Engineering Department, School of Engineering , University of Warwick3
Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran1,2, United Kingdom3
m_Safkhani@iust.ac.ir1, M _Naderi@iust.ac.ir 2, H.Rashvand@warwick.ac.uk3
Protocol (FLMAP), where designers claim their protocol
guarantees tag anonymity, forward security, and
location privacy whilst has resistance against ID
disclosure and desynchronization attacks [10]. We,
however, put FLMAP under a new rigorous test for a
thorough cryptanalysis investigation for surprising
results.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In
section 2 some preliminaries and notations will be
presented. In section 3 we describe FLMAP and its
designing flaw. Section 4 discusses desynchronization
and ID disclosure attacks against FLMAP. Section 5
proposes our solutions to fix FLMAP security flaws
against investigated attacks. Concluding remarks are
presented in section 6.

Abstract- Security counts as a critical barrier to continuing
growth of RFID industry due to lack of a proper high
performance lightweight protocol-based solution. Amongst
recent developments the Fast Lightweight Mutual
Authentication Protocol (FLMAP) has been accepted for
its superior speed and low complexity features. Here we
examine the security strengths of FLMAP through
systematic cryptanalysis tests. Outcome of our
investigation show that in spite of its superior speed and
power saving features FLMAP shows some serious design
gaps and shortfalls against two specifically selected
desynchronization and ID disclosure attacks. Finally, we
propose solutions to fix the FLMAP designing and security
flaws.

Keywords-Security Test, RFID, FLMAP, Desynchronization,
ID Disclosure, Cryptanalysis

1.

2.

INTRODUCTION

PRELIMINARIES

It is a general assumption for an RFID authentication
protocol to consider the channel between the reader and
the back-end database secure. Hence, in whole of this
paper we do not distinguish between the reader and the
back-end database of FLMAP. To describe the FLMAP,
we follow the notations used by the designers of
FLMAP [10] which are as follows:
•
k = k1 || k2 indicates tag’s secret key.

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless
tag identification system that incorporates three entities:
the tag, the reader and the back-end database. The tag is
a highly constraint microchip equipped with an antenna
that stores the identifier and other related information
about the holder of the tag. The reader is a device that
can read or modify the stored information in the tags
and transfer them to a back-end database, with or
without modification. The reader stores tags identifiers,
pseudonyms and secrets in the back-end database.
Upon recent growth of RFID applications due to
accommodating private information and associated
implications on human-life many have raised serious
security concerns for their unprotected use putting extra
pressure on these devices. Most important is that RFID
systems normally need to operate over limited resources
and work under very restricted conditions where only
light weight security protocols can be adopted. Many
mutual authentication protocols are proposed so that
tags and readers can securely authenticate each other. So
far, several lightweight mutual authentication protocols
have been claimed suitable to be employed in RFID
applications [3, 7, 8, 10]. However, most of these
protocols have failed to achieve the required security
goals [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9]. Sadighian and Jalili have
introduced their superior mutual authentication protocol
called the Fast Lightweight Mutual Authentication

•
•
•
•
•
•

ID, INX indicate tag’s static and dynamic
identifier respectively.
∨ indicates bitwise ”OR” operation.
∧ indicates bitwise ”AND” operation.
⊕ indicates bitwise ”XOR” operation.
¬ indicates bitwise “Not” operation.
tsys is a parameter which is used by the

•

reader to indicate the system’s time.
ttag is a parameter which is used by the tag

•

to indicate the tag’s time and updates after
each successful run of protocol.
tmax is the upper bound of tsys which tag can

•
•
•

accept.
t0 is a value which is used as the initial
value of ttag .
All parameters in the protocol are of length
L-bit.
A → B refers to assigning A to B.
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•

n2 = 0,1, 2 and 3. Therefore the protocol can not be run
properly.
To solve the above designing flaw, one of the
designers suggested [11] to replace the ”OR” operation
with
”XOR”
such
that
in x = k1 ∨ (n1 ⊕ n2 )
x = k1 ⊕ (n1 ⊕ n2 ) . Hence, after modification, given x , k1
and n1 it is possible to extract n2 uniquely. Hence, we
present our attacks for this variant of FLMAP.

$
χ ⎯⎯
→ x is the experiment of uniformly

choosing a random element from a finite set
χ and assigning it to x .
3.

FLMAP DESCRIPTION

The FLMAP, which has been depicted in Algorithm
1, runs as follows:
1. The reader sends a pseudorandom number n1 and
the system time tsys to the tag.

4.

ATTACKS ON THE PROTOCOL

2. The tag verifies the condition ttag < tsys < tmax . If it is
We made the following observations in the FLMAP
protocol:
1. n2 affects x , y and z through ⊕ operation.
2. The outputs of the operations that have been used
in the key updating phase of the algorithm are biased.
3. tsys has no impact on the reader calculations and it

correct, tag generates another pseudorandom number
n2 ,
computes
x = k1 ∨ (n1 ⊕ n2 ) ,
called
y = k1 ⊕ ID ⊕ n2 and sends x, y and it’s INX to the
reader. Otherwise, the tag sends two meaningless
pseudorandom numbers such that reader can not trace
the tag and the protocol will be terminated.
3. Reader extracts n2 from x and calculates
y′ = k1 ⊕ ID ⊕ n2 and authenticates the tag if y′ = y .
Then, the reader computes z = k2 ⊕ ( ID ∧ n2 ) and sends it
to the tag and updates keys and INX as follows:

is only used by the tag as a part of reader authentication
process. We use these observations to mount our attacks
on FLAMP.
4.1

Desynchronization Attack

k1next = k2 ∧ (n1 ⊕ n2 )

Tag and reader share different values to authenticate
each other, e.g. keys and ID and update some of the
shared values in each successful interaction. For
example, in FLMAP, k1 , k2 , ID and INX are used
through authentication process and k1 , k2 and INX are
updated after each successful interaction. However, if
attacker forces tag and reader to update those values
such that they can not authenticate each other any more,
we say that they have been desynchronized and the
attack known as a desynchronization attack. We can
desynchronize the tag and the reader of FLMAP
following the approach depicted in Algorithm 2. This
attack is a man in the middle attack and works as
follows:
1. The attacker receives the first message, i.e. (n1 , tsys )

k 2next = k1 ∧ (n1 ⊕ n2 )
INX next = ( INX ∨ ID) ⊕ n2

However, if y ≠ y′ then the protocol will be
terminated.
4. The tag calculates z′ = k2 ⊕ ( ID ∧ n2 ) and verifies
the condition z = z′ . If the equality occurs, that means
the reader also has been authenticated for the tag and the
tag updates its ttag , keys and INX as follows:
ttag = tsys
k1 = k2 ∧ ( n1 ⊕ n2 )
k2 = k1 ∧ ( n1 ⊕ n2 )
INX = ( INX ∨ ID ) ⊕ n2

Based on the designers claim [10], to overcome the
desynchronization attack the reader of FLMAP saves
two
records
of
keys
and
index,
i.e.
(k1old , k2old , INX old ) and (k1next , k2next , INX next ) . However, we
will present an efficient desynchronization attack against
this protocol in section 4.

and forwards it to the tag without any changes.
2. Tag evaluates ttag < tsys < tmax . If the condition is
correct, then tag generates n2 , computes x = k1 ⊕ n1 ⊕ n2
, y = k1 ⊕ ID ⊕ n2 and sends x, y and INX to the
reader.
3. The attacker intercepts the sent x, y and INX ,
flips the most significant bit (MSB) of x and y , we
denote the new values by x* and y* , passes x* , y* and
INX to the reader.
4. The reader extracts n2* = x* ⊕ k1 ⊕ n1 and
authenticate the tag if k1 ⊕ ID ⊕ n2* = y* . Reader then

3.1. A FLAMP Design Issue
The designers of FLMAP claimed that after the
second pass of algorithm the reader extracts n2 from x
uniquely. However, recall that x = k1 ∨ (n1 ⊕ n2 ) , n2 may
not be uniquely extracted from x . For example, set
k1 = 3 , x = 3 and n1 = 3 , one can see that, because of the
”OR” operation, we have four options for n2 which are

International Journal of Computer and Communication Technology (IJCCT), ISSN: 2231-0371, Vol-3, Iss-2

128

Cryptanalysis of the Fast Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol

sends z = k2 ⊕ ( ID ∧ n* ) to the tag and updates k1 , k2 and
2

INX .

5. The attacker passes z to the tag.
6. If
k2 ⊕ ( ID ∧ n2* ) = k2 ⊕ ( ID ∧ n2 ) ,
the tag
authenticates the reader and updates k1 , k2 and INX .
If all steps of the above attack executed, it means that
the reader has used n2* in the updating phase while the
tag has used n2 . Hence, the new values of keys and
INX in the tag are not equal to those values in the
reader and they can not authenticate each other any
more. Now, we should determine the success probability
of the above attack.
If the attacker flips the MSB of x , where the flipped
value denoted by x* , it leads to a flip in the MSB of
extracted n2 with the probability of “1”, where the
extracted n2 denoted by n2* . So, if we compare
k1 ⊕ ID ⊕ n2 with k1 ⊕ ID ⊕ n2* it is obvious that they are
different in MSB with the probability of “1”. On the
other hand, the attacker already has flipped the MSB of
y , called y * . Hence, with the probability of “1” the
reader authenticates the tag. Therefore, the success
probability of this phase of attack is “1”.
Now we consider the success probability of the next
phase of attack where the reader sends z = k2 ⊕ ( ID ∧ n2* )
to the tag and the tag compares it with z′ = k2 ⊕ ( ID ∧ n2 )
and if z = z′ then authenticates the reader and updates
the keys and INX . On the other hand, we know that the
only different between n2 and n2* is their MSB. In
addition, for any given two single-bit values b and b′ if
one flips either b or b′ the result of b ∧ b ' will flip with
the probability of 1 2 . Hence, with the probability of
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properly for which legitimate readers and tags may fail
authenticating each other, which make the protocol un
acceptable. In addition, when the above flaw get fixed,
we present desynchronization and ID disclosure attacks
against FLMAP with negligible complexities and the
success probability not less than 1 2 .
Some vulnerabilities of FLMAP that have been
employed through the above attacks are as follows:
1- n 2 does not extract from x uniquely.

1 , the equality z = z′ would be true and the tag accepts
2
the received z and does the updating phase. So, for one

run of algorithm, the total success probability of attack
is 1 2 .
Remark 1. When, at the first step of protocol, the reader
sends tsys to the tag, tag evaluates ttag < tsys < tmax and
continues the game if this condition is true and uses tsys

2- k1next and k2next in updating phase equations
congruent to zero after some successful runs of protocol.
3- tsys has no impact on the reader calculations and it

as the ttag of the next run of protocol. However, if the
attacker intercepts the reader’s message and replaces
tsys with a new tsys which is extremely larger than the

is only used by the tag as a part of reader authentication
process.
Taking the above in to account, we propose the
following modifications in to the messages of mutual
authentication phase and updating phase of FLMAP:

sent tsys , but smaller than tmax , then it may lead to
desynchronization attack from the next run of protocol.
To determine a reasonable upper bound for tmax , the
attacker can use a try and error process.
4.2

x = n2 ⊕ [( ID ∧ k1 ) ∨ (¬ID ∧ k2 )]

ID Disclosure Attack

y = [n2 ∧ ( ID ⊕ k1 ⊕ tsys )] ∨ [¬n2 ∧ (¬ID ⊕ k2 ⊕ ¬tsys )]
z = k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ [(tsys ∧ n2 ) ∨ (¬tsys ∧ ID)]

At the end of each interaction, the FLMAP’s tag and
reader update keys and INX as follows:

k1next = [(k1 ∧ n1 ) ∨ (¬k1 ∧ n2 )] ⊕ [(tsys ∧ k2 ) ∨ (¬tsys ∧ ID )]

k1next = k2 ∧ (n1 ⊕ n2 )
k

next
2

INX

k 2next = [(k 2 ∧ n2 ) ∨ (¬k2 ∧ n1 )] ⊕ [(¬tsys ∧ k1 ) ∨ (tsys ∧ ID)]

= k1 ∧ (n1 ⊕ n2 )
next

INX next = [( INX ∧ (k1 ⊕ k2 )) ∨ (¬INX ∧ ID )] ⊕ n2

= ( INX ∨ ID) ⊕ n2

This modification leads to strength the FLMAP
security against the mentioned weaknesses as follows:
1-Given x, ID, k1 and k2 then n2 can be extracted
uniquely.
2- The k1next and k2next updating phase equations are
not biased operations.
3- tsys is used in all steps of algorithm. Hence, the

Since the k1 and k2 are 96-bit values, their average
hamming weight is 48, where the hamming weight of A
is defined as the number of “1” in the binary
representation of A. On the other hand for any given two
single-bit b and b′ the result of b ∧ b′ would be equal
to “1” if and only if b = 1 and b′ = 1 . Hence, for any
random selection of b and b′ the result of b ∧ b′ would
be “0” with the probability of 3 4 . So, we expect that,

attacker has no control over it.
6.

after the first run of protocol, approximately 72 bits of
each of k1 and k2 congruent to “0”. After the second
successful run of protocol, we expect 90 bits of each of
k1 and k2 congruent to “0”. Therefore, after several
successful runs of protocol all bits of k1 and k2
congruent to “0”. Assume k1 = 0 and recall that n1 is
known for the attacker then the attacker can uniquely
extract n2 from x , where x = k1 ⊕ (n1 ⊕ n2 ) . Now, given
n2 and y the attacker can uniquely disclose ID from y
as follows, where y = k1 ⊕ ID ⊕ n2 :

In this work we have analyzed the designing procedure
and the security features of the Fast Lightweight Mutual
Authentication Protocol (FLMAP). The study reveals
that FLMAP comes with some serious drawbacks in
both protocol design and security of the process. We
have shown that the protocol also has a flaw that could
jeopardize the execution and that a desynchronization
attack that desynchronizes the tag and reader in a single
run with the probability of 1 2 and it may disclose the
ID in several runs of protocol.
All in all we do not recommend FLMAP, as it stands,
to be employed in any application. However, we
proposed some modifications to algorithm which
improve the security of protocol against the presented
attack. The security analysis of protocol against other
attacks is the subject of future works.

ID = y ⊕ k1 ⊕ n2

5.

CONCLUSION

IMPROVING FLMAP

In spite of claimed superior feature of FLMAP, our
analyses show a design flaw in the algorithm and several
drawbacks on the security of this algorithm. More
precisely, the proposed algorithm does not work
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